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Limitations to Monarchical Power
Wim Blockmans
England, reputed in the world for the antiquity of its constitutional
and parliamentary traditions, probably up to the seventeenth Century
had the highest record in western Europe with regard to violent attacks
against kings and their immediate environment. Physical assaülts
against kings or princes did not occur in the old German Empire, and
in other kingdoms they were truly exceptional, if they happened at all.
This does not mean that there have been no depositions or other forms
of limitations of monarchical power. But the frequent resort to physi-
cal elimination, however, by murder or by execution after some form
of trial, remains such an extreme political practice that it deserves
deeper and more general explanations than those merely related to the
'shortcomings of individuals'.1
One can study this problem by looking at the legitimacy of monar-
chie rule and the justification of grievances or accusations brought
against it. It is highly relevant to distinguish arguments related to the
allegedly divine foundation of monarchy, or to arguments related to a
secular Standard of good governance. Physical elimination of kings and
their close relatives was a Standard practice among the first generations
of the Merovingian dynasty. Until 679, murder was a current practice
in the political system. After that date, the impact of Christianisation
on the legitimacy of kingship would have channelled political rivalries
towards less violent methods.2 However correct this Interpretation
might be, it cannot be generalised to the Situation in late-medieval and
early-modern England, since one has to assume that the level of
Christianization was no less there than in the seventh- or eighth-
century Frankish kingdoms. And even if the personality of some rulers
might have shown serious shortcomings, this does not yet imply that a
king should for that reason be deposed, executed or even murdered.
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Nothing is self-evident in such behaviour, especially not within a thor-
oughly Christian context. Theological theories about tyrannicide
cannot explain the practical Variation between Christian monarchies
either, since these remained very restrictive, while alleged tyrants have
been treated differently in different countries.
Therefore, it seems appropriate to compare cases in a number of west-
European countries. Political practice was a major source of the develop-
ment of political thought, and often triggered its elaboration.3
Moreover, it is important to compare the effective frequency and nature
of the physical assaults on the ruler in order to distinguish the circum-
stances that led to such political acts. I therefore concentrate on the
experience of the principalities of the Low Countries in the later Middle
Ages and the sixteenth Century, and compare the typology of violent
political conflicts there with that of the Scandinavian kingdoms. These
two regions, often left out in analysis, are quite different in geographi-
cal, social and economie respects; their political traditions also followed
very different paths. Since during the period under consideration no
murders of monarchs occurred in the latter, and only two in the former
region, the question has to be addressed in which ways deep political
crises were handled in the regions. The identification of the main con-
tenders within each political system, its structure and culture should
enable us to formulate conditions for the frequent resort to physical
violence in England, as opposed to other known devices in limiting the
power of monarchs. Let us first try to establish a casuistic catalogue by
type of treatment.
Murder and execution
Two cases of monarchical murder are famous in the history of the Low
Countries since they immediately triggered strong emotional reactions
among the population and gave birth to a cultic tradition. The earliest
is that of Charles the Good, count of Flanders, in 1127, while hè was
praying in Saint Donatian's church in Bruges. It was immediately clear
that this was an act of revenge by a member of the clan led by the
chancellor. He had been in office for 35 years and had become the
leader of a mighty clan whose abuse of power had been challenged by
the count. The murderers and their followers were soon annihilated,
the murdered count was soon beatified and one of the local canons
wrote a detailed report of the events copied throughout the Middle
Ages and published in several translations.4 It is clear that in this case
the victim was a monarch whose correct and modernising policy went
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agamst usurped positions, hè had the law and the majonty of the
people on his side
The murder in 1296 of Count Flons V of Holland and Zeeland has a
comparable background This ruler was equally praised for his good
governance but nis change of alliances with England and Flanders on
the one hand, and France on the other, led to a conspiracy of some
Holland noblemen, probably supported by Edward I and Count Guy of
Flanders The murderers were soon sentenced and the event gave rise
to a hterary tradition in which the plotters were blamed s
Both cases can be interpreted as a traditional feudal reaction agamst
a modernismg pnnce, whom the plotters could not yet sec as a deper-
sonahsed ruler A similai fate had struck Kmg Canute IV ot Denmark,
Count Charles the Good's father He had been murdered in 1086 while
repentmg m Saint Alban's church m Odense He had tned to introducé
stnct rehgious laws, which had provoked resistance, after his expedi-
tion agamst England had tailed, hè had tned to put down an msurrec-
tion The people's bad feelmgs about the murder led to the kmg's
prompt beatification m 1101
The fact that all these cases occurred before the mtroduction of a
depersonahsed state, may lead us to conclude that the mstitutionalisa-
tion of monarthy based on sacral prmciples became a decisive factor
As a consequence, the execution of a prmce's high officials, held
responsible for bad governance, became a frequent practice, especially
m the cities of the Low Countnes The most famous case is that of the
public execution of chancellor Guillaume Hugonet and governor Guy
de Brimeu, seigneur d'Humbercourt, after a summary trial by the local
authonties m rebelhous Ghent m 1477 At the same time, dozens of
local magistrates were similarly sentenced for their collaboration with
the deceased duke Charles the Bold fi More executions of high officeis
of the duke took place durmg the revolts at Bruges m 1436 and 1488 7
Although during these revolts the course of justice surely was not
correct, none of these executions of offlcers can be labelled as murder
as there was always a foimal accusation, some kind of trial, and the
executions were public
Captivity
Rulers could be held captive when they suffered from mental illness,
which made them not only mcapable of governing but also possibly
dangerous In none of these cases was the ruler dethroned, but effective
power transferred to the hands of a regent Such was the well-known
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i.ise of the unhappy Count William V of Hainault, Holland and
A-eland. His illness appeared quite suddenly in 1357, sonie years after
lus accession to the throne. His frenetic behaviour led the family to call
npon his younger brother Albert, Duke of Bavaria. He effectively ruled
l hè three counties as regent until William's death in 1389, after stark
i aptivity in the castle of Le Quesnoy in Hainault; only then did Albert
.issume his brother's comital titles.8 During his years of captivity,
William feil into nearly absolute insanity. Later chroniclers passed
iripidly over his rule, seemingly embarrassed by the count's incapacity.
Queen Joan of Castile was never deprived of her royal crown of
Oastile while she was kept in safe custody in the castle at Tordesillas.
Over nearly 50 years until her death in 1555 she received very little
public attention, with the sole exception of the comunews rebels who
in 1520 tried to use her authority for their sake.9 While her father had
luled as regent in her name during her son Charles's minority, the
latter had himselt jointly crowned as king of Castile.1" Madness was a
most embarrassing phenomenon for a ruler chosen by God's grace.
Contemporaries dealt with such situations as they could, leaving the
unlucky monarchs very little except their title.
Count Reynold l of Guelders (ruled 1271-1318) offers a more com-
plicated case. His son Reynold had him imprisoned in Montfoort castle
because of his absent-mindedness, due to old age. His behaviour had
seemed extravagant to his Contemporaries for some years already, but
it can hardly be considered as madness, rather more an increasing inca-
pacity to govern. It was not until his father's death in 11526 that the
son took the title of count."
It seems that depositions then became part of the political tradition
in Guelders, since in 1361 Duke Reynold III was dethroned by his
younger brother Edward. However, Reynold returned to office for some
months after Edward's death in 1371. This clearly points to rivalry
rather than to any explicit argument about bad government or to inca-
pacity due to mental weakness. During William's ensuing minority, his
mother ruled as regent until she in her turn was deposed in 1379. In
1465, the ambitieus Adolphe imprisoned his father Duke Arnold,
whose title he usurped. In 1471, however, Arnold was brought back to
the throne under pressure from Duke Charles of Burgundy on condi-
tion of his recognising him as his only heir. Thus Charles could take
possession of the duchy in 1473. When he died in 1477, Adolphe
returned as the duke, albeit it again for some months only, since hè
died on the battlefield in June of that year. The repeated depositions
are obvious indications of the monarchy's weakness, prone as it was to
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foreign interference and pressure from noble or urban groupings
within the duchy. In none of these cases did public debate make an
explicit argument about the quality of government: rivalry for power
in a weakly developed political and administrative System seemed the
only motive.
During the struggle for power in the 1420s and 1430s in the counties
of Hainault, Holland and Zeeland, Countess Jacqueline of Bavaria was
kept as a virtual prisoner by her rival Duke Philip of Burgundy, during
the summer of 1425. While it was his firm Intention to bring her under
his even tighter control to Lilie, she managed narrowly to escape,
dressed as a man. The aim of her captivity was not only to keep her
away from her territories, but also to prevent her from seeking support,
remarrying, and, the worst possible scenario, eventually producing an
heir. Another of her competitors, her uncle John of Bavaria, had died
in January of that year, murdered, as it was claimed by some and con-
fessed to under duress by a suspect, with a poisoned prayer-book.12 All
these exceptional events had very little to do with the justification of
good government towards the people, but more with the struggle by
any means among contenders for the throne.
A monarch's captivity for reasons of bad government occurred rather
seldom on the European continent, though two noticeable cases
deserve attention. Christian II had been elected as king of Denmark,
Norway and Sweden in 1513. However, the three crown councils had
formulated such strict conditions for his government that hè
attempted ferociously to subdue the nobility and the clergy. After the
so-called Stockholm massacre, the Swedish ting renounced their alle-
giance to him in 1522. A year later, a revolt in Denmark forced him
into exile to the Low Countries where hè sought the support of his
mighty brother-in-law, Emperor Charles V. When in 1531 hè finally
attempted an Invasion in Norway, his successor Frederick I threw him
in jail where hè was kept until his death in 1559. Under the system of
the Scandinavian elective monarchy, severa! kings had been dethroned
but they mostly chose to live in exile. Some were even called back,
such as the Swedish King Karl Knutson in 1464.13 The harshness of
Christian's treatment can be explained legally by his attempt to recap-
ture the crown by military means. Moreover, this king was generally
renowned for his brutal and foolish character. Nevertheless, it is strik-
ing that the Scandinavians did not execute him, as might have
happened in similar situations in England.
Another noticeable case of monarchical captivity is that of the Roman
King Maximilian. During three-and-a-half months in 1488 the burghers
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of Bruges kept their ruler - hè then was tutor and regent for his younger
son - in safe custody within their walls. But they had no preconceived
plan in mind, and became increasingly embarrassed by the Situation
they had themselves created, having reacted impulsively to what they
had feit was a military threat. After having let Maximilian enter the city,
they had shut the gates to keep his troops outside, afraid as they were
for their repression. Under his eyes they overthrew and incriminated
the local magistrale, captured several of his principal councillors and
executed some of them on the main square. A revolutionary regency
council then took over power in the county of Flanders. They liberated
Maximilian only after hè had subscribed to substantial limitations of his
authority and left two high noblemen as hostages. In the long-lasting
period of tension between Maximilian and his subjects in the Low
Countries, the unexpected and totally unprecedented captivity of such
a high-ranking monarch was used by the representative institutions to
strengthen their constitutional position.14 More generally, captivity of
entitled monarchs appears to have been very exceptional on the conti-
nent. It has been applied as a means of eliminating opponents in unsta-
ble dynastical situations such as that in Guelders, and briefly also in
Holland.
Deposition and exile
Widespread dissatisfaction with a ruler's policy repeatedly led to revolts
forcing him into exile. In the course of the fourteenth Century the
county of Flanders repeatedly saw large uprisings that reduced or tem-
porarily annihilated the monarch's grasp. The young Count Louis de
Nevers faced a broad rebellion of the peasants, which became linked to
a revolt of the artisans against the patrician magistrate in the city of
Bruges. Over five years, from 1323 to 1328, the count lost control of
more than half his territory, which hè could recover only through the
Intervention of a French army. At the outbreak of the Hundred Years'
War in 1337, the same count had to corroborate the policy of a revolu-
tionary government in Ghent. Apart from their antipathy towards the
French monarchy, which had repeatedly helped to oppress them,
the Flemish communes indeed had strong economie reasons to opt for
the English side. In 1340 Edward III was hailed on the Friday Market in
Ghent as the king of France. In 1342, the count himself was replaced
by a regent, the Lombard banker Simon de Mirabelle, who had lent
Ghent large sums of money. For about ten years, the county was in fact
ruled by a consortium of the three major cities, while in each of them
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the craftsmen, especially those in the dominant textile industry, hek
strong influence in the administration.
A similar revolt forced Count Louis of Male into exile to France from
1379 until nis death in 1384. It was only by giving in to nearly all the
claims of the three major cities, that nis son-in-law, Duke Philip the
Bold of Burgundy, managed to pacify the county as a whole in 1385.
The count could hardly counter-balance the power of the major cities,
as long as they remained united, which certainly was not always the
case. The Opposition against the Flemish monarchs was thus not so
much targeting on complaints about their personal rule in particular:
the issue was rather more about the form of government, whereby the
main forces in the county strove at having a direct say in all matters
regarding them. The monarchy as such was not at stake, more its will-
ingness to share power in many respects, particularly with the leaders
of the largest cities. During the fourteenth Century, the person of the
count was never assaulted, none of the counts was deposed, nor
did anybody plead in favour of a purely republican constitution.
Nevertheless, the extraordinarily high frequency of regional and local
revolts established a very delicate balance in which particular circum-
stances of any nature might easily tip the scales. During the roughly
270 years between 1297 and the Great Revolt of the Netherlands,
general revolts raged in the county for a total of 28 years, with large
uprisings in at least one of the major cities in another 14 years more;
altogether, Flanders was in revolt one year m seven, a frequency which,
like that of bad harvests, must have left deep imprints in the people's
collective memories.'s During the fifteenth Century, some local revolts
turned into dangerous situations for the dukes and their immediate
environment, but even in the greatest turmoil their persons neverthe-
less remained untouchable.
Duke John IV of Brabant fled the city of Brussels on 30 September
1420 after several months of sharp confrontations with the States. The
duchy had already by then an exceptional constitutional tradition,
which had developed through a long series of problematic successions
to the throne. John had succeeded to his father who was killed at the
battle of Agincourt in 1415, at the age of 13. The States had immediately
installed a regency council from within their midst. It must be said that
Duke John IV seems to have been a very weak personality in all respects.
He had been married to Countess Jacqueline of Bavaria, but she left him
fairly quickly and hè saw no possibility of gaining any authority in her
territories, although the States of Brabant had granted aid for just this
purpose. The States kept firm control over him by prescribing that all
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.K is issued by the duke had to be sealed in the presence of four council-
Idis at least. After two years, the duke got rid of the regency council, but
i lic States remained vigilant. In 1420, they drafted a list of grievances
.i^iinst the government, for which the councillors were held responsi-
lilc. Infringements against the Inauguration charter were listed, control
w.is claimed of the financial policy, especially of the expenditure of the
.nel granted by the States, and of the appointment of high officers. The
siates held 'evil councillors' responsible for bad government and called
upon the duke's younger brother Philip of Saint-Pol, to act as regent
under their firm control. After two failed attempts to recover the city, in
May 1421 John had to agree to the principle that the States could law-
lully refuse any service to the duke and choose a regent in his place in
Ihe event of, and as long as the duke continued to, infringe any rights
,md privileges of the subjects. Further confrontations during the follow-
mg years indicated the firm Intention of the barons and the cities to
keep the control they had gained.16
In the course of the fifteenth Century several Scandinavian Rings
were removed from the throne under pressure from assemblies of the
lour estates and rebellions. It happened to Erik in 1435-36, with his
lormal deposition in 1439; Karl Knutson was dethroned and forced
into exile in 1457; Christian l was exiled from Sweden to Denmark in
1464; Karl was then called back, but dethroned again in 1470. In each
case, decisions were taken by councils composed of dozens of bishops,
knights and squires who enforced extensive accession charters on the
candidates.17
Institutionalised control
Although the level of social diversification and the population density
were much higher in the Low Countries than in Scandinavia, we
observe similar tendencies to try and limit by legal means excesses in
the exercise of monarchical power. The cases of murder and imprison-
rnent were all related to rivalries among noble contenders for the
throne. Assemblies and rebellions by the subjects, on the other hand,
tended to bind rulers to contracts and to keep an eye on the applica-
tion of the agreements. If no form of collaboration seemed possible,
flight or exile were the best possible options, with no wish to attack the
person of the monarch physically.
In the course of the fifteenth Century, several institutional arrange-
ments developed in the Low Countries which all created opportunities
for dialogue and criticism on the monarch's rule. The representative
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institutions met at frequent intervals and tended to unite on the same
scale as that of the territorial extension of the dynastie state. They have
often been the forum for very open, even conflictual exchanges of
political choices.18 Further, the monarchs created institutions where
they accepted they would be criticised and even corrected. In the chap-
ters of the Oider of the Golden Fleece, the Knights were all entitled to
expound grievances against all members, the sovereign included. The
minutes show that this did effectively happen under Charles the Bold
and Maximilian. On a larger scale, subjects could introducé cases
against the government before the high court, the Great Council, con-
solidated in Mechelen in 1504. The autonomy of the court allowed cer-
tainly for legal redress of grievances, beyond the administrative
practice developed in this regard in the course of the negotiations in
the representative assemblies.
In the extreme case of the deposition of King Philip II of Spain as
lord in the principalities of the Low Countries, the States General
proceeded with extreme legalistic vigilance, seeking precedents and
enumerating violations against concrete articles and stipulations of
the Inauguration charters and oaths.19 They referred to natural and
canon law, but tyrannicide did not enter their scope. It was clearly
not a general phenomenon in European political culture, after the
time of feudal competition before the Wars of Religion, to think in
these terms.
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